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I 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
WILLIAM PARLEY SPRATLING and 
DAISY SPRATLING, 
Plaintiffs, Respondents, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its LAND 
BOARD, 
Defendant, Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10947 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs are seeking quiet title to mineral rights 
in land, the surface right to which they undisputibly 
possess. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs initiated this action on July 12, 1966, by 
filing the complaint herein pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated§ 78-11-9 (1953). Defendant was personally 
served and answered. There being no issue of fact 
to be determined, both plaintiffs and defendant 
moved for summary judgment. The matter came on 
for hearing on April 20, 1967, before the Honorable 
Marcellus K. Snow, District Judge, sitting without a 
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jury, at Salt Lake City, Utah. The matter was at thot 
time taken under advisement. 
On May 4, 1967, the court entered its order hold-
ing that plaintiffs were the owners in fee simple of 
the property in question and that defendant, in ef-
fect, held no right, title, or interest in the minerals 
thereon. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The lower court found an enforceable writte:1 
contract to purchase lands which contained no res-
ervation to the State of Utah of the minerals thereon. 
Defendant seeks reversal of that determination or 
in the alternative, a determination that the State has 
taken the mineral rights in question by use of its 
police power and therefore a finding that the State 
of Utah is in fact the owner in fee of all mineral rights 
in these lands. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The land inovlved in this dispute is situated in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more specifically, 
Township 2 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Merid-
ian, Section 28, Lots 5 and 6; Section 29, Lots 7 and 8. 
On February 6, 1907, Mr. Charles J. Shoup and 
Mr. Frederick D. Jaynes of Murray, Utah, executed 
an Agreement to Purchase Selected Lands encom-
passing the lands herein. August 8, 1907, the Utah 
Board of Land Commissioners, predecessor of de-
fendant herein, accepted this agreement. There is 
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no mention in this document of mineral rights al-
though it does provide: 
That after said lands shall have been seiected 
by the State of Utah and a patent therefor has been 
issued to the State by the authorized officers of the 
United States, affiant will purchase the land at 
private sale at the rate of two dollars and fifty cents 
per acre on ten years time, in accordance with the 
provisions of the law governing land sales. 
The Board of Land Commissioners selected these 
lands on selection list no. 1052 which was filed in 
the United States Land Office, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on September 27, 1907. This selection was approved 
by the United States Land Office on November 1, 
1907, on approved Jist no. 89. 
On September 29, 1908, the original selectors 
assigned their rights to the lands in question to the 
Garfield Smelting Company. On October 20, 1919, 
the lands were found by the United States Depart-
ment of the Interior to be subject to selection by the 
State of Utah and not to be mineral in character. On 
October 24, 1919, the United States Department of 
the Interior approved selection by the State of Utah. 
On June 2, 1920, the Utah State Land Board is-
sued a certificate of sale to the Garfield Smelting 
Company without reserving mineral rights to the 
State of Utah, and on July 26, 1920, the Utah State 
Land Board issued a patent thereon. Again there was 
no reservation to the State of Utah of mineral rights 
in the lands in question. The plaintiffs herein have 
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succeeded to all right, title, and interest of the Gar-
field Smelting Company in the aforesaid land. 
On January 28, 1964, the Utah State Land Board 
filed for record in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder a Notice of Claim of the State of Utah to 
all minerals within the lands in question, but in said 
Notice there was a typogrnphical error designating 
section 28 as section 38. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE 
MINERAL INTERESTS IN THE SUBJECT LAND TO 
BE VESTED IN THE PLAINTIFFS. 
A. THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES SHOWS A RES-
ERVATION TO THE STATE OF THESE MINERAL 
RIGHTS. 
Appellant will show that the mineral rights in 
the subject land are by law vested in the State of 
Utah and by virtue of statute, the Utah State Land 
Board has control of these mineral rights. There is 
no dispute that if the State of Utah does in fact own 
the mineral rights in question, the Utah State Land 
Board by virtue of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. j 
65-1-14 (1951) has disposition of it. 
The applicable law coupled with the intent of 
the parties make it clear that respondents herein 
have no valid claim to the mineral rights in these 
lands. There is no question that respondents have 
fee title to the surface of these lands. 
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The intent of the parties is shown in the word-
ing of the Agreement to Purchase Selected Lands 
executed on February 6, 1907, and approved by the 
Utah State Board of Land Commissioners on August 
S, 1907. That document recites in part: 
That after said lands shall have been selected 
by the State of Utah and a patent therefore has been 
issued to the State by the authorized officers of 
the United States, affiant will purchase the land at 
private sale at the rate of two dollars and 50 cents 
per acre on 10 years time, in accordance with the 
provisions of the law governing land sales. (emphasis 
added) 
There is no illegality in binding oneself to fu-
ture laws. Although in general parties are deemed 
to contract with reference to the state of the law as 
it exists at the time of making the contract, there is 
nothing to prevent them from doing so with refer-
ence to a state of the law which does not then exist, 
particularly where it appears by the terms of the 
agreement that changed conditions of the law might 
reasonably be expected. People ex rel Platt v. Wem-
ple, 117 N.Y. 136, 22 NE 1046 (1889). 
It is agreed that the sale to respondents' ante-
cedents in interest occured on July 26, 1920, with the 
issuance of the patent covering these lands to the 
Garfield Smelting Company. The law governing 
land sales in ] 920 was expanded by Utah Laws 1919, 
ch. 107 § 1 which is now found as Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann.§ 65-1-14, to -17 (1961). 
For clarity, appellant will refer to these enact-
ments by section number of the Compiled Laws of 
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Utah, 191 7, as amended. Section 55 7 5 gave the Board 
of Land Commissioners exclusive direction, man-
agement and control of all lands theretofore or there-
after granted to the State by the United States gov-
ernment. Sections 557Sx and 5575xl are the two re-
quiring interpretation in this case. These are set 
forth in full as follows: 
5575x. Mineral lands. All coal and other min-
eral deposits in lands belonging to the State are 
hereby reserved to the State. Such deposits are re-
served from sale except upon a rental and royalty 
basis as herein provided and the purchaser of any 
land belonging to the State shall acquire no right, 
title or interest in or to such deposits, and the right 
of such purchaser shall be subject to the reservation 
of all coal and other mineral deposits and to the 
conditions and limitations prescribed by law pro-
viding for the State and persons authorized by it to 
prospect for, mine, and remove such deposits and to 
occupy and use so much of the surface of said land 
as may be required for all purposse reasonably in-
cident to the mining and removal of such deposits 
therefrom. 
5575x1. Purchases-reservation-certificates. 
All applications to purchase approved subsequent to 
the passage of this Act shall be subject to a reserva-
tion to the State of all coal and other mineral de-
posits in said land and with the right to the State 
or persons authorized by it to prospect for, mine 
and remove the same as provided by law, and, all 
certificates of sale issued therefrom shall contain 
such reservation. 
This enactment was made effective May 12, 
1919, and was therefore the "law governing land 
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sales" at the date of the purchase in 1920. The applic-
able portion of section 5575x provides: 
ALL coal and other mineral deposits in lands 
belonging to the State are hereby reserved to the 
State. Such deposits are reserved from sale ... and 
the purchaser of any land belonging to the State 
shall acquire no right, title or interest in or to such 
deposits and the right of such purchaser shall be 
subject to the reservation of all coal and other min-
eral deposits. (emphasis added) 
Therefore, the instrument by which the re-
spondents' interest arose is clear in applying the 
above quoted statute to any sale arising therefrom. 
The respondents should not now be allowed to 
escape their contractual obligations of having the 
mineral interests reserved in the State of Utah and 
this court should so hold as a matter of law. 
B. EXERCISE OF THE STATE'S POLICE POWER IS 
SUFFICIENT TO ABROGATE PRIOR CONTRACTURAL 
RELATIONSHIPS WHEN THE INTENT TO DO SO IS 
CLEAR. 
The trial court apparently held that there was a 
fully executed contract in effect on August 8, 1907, 
and since no reservation of mineral interests to the 
State of Utah was shown thereon, any subsequent 
legislation could not alter these "vested rights" be-
cause such statutes as applied to contract rights of 
respondent's predecessors in interest would amount 
to an unconstitutional impairment of contract. 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-32 (1961) allows an indi-
vidual to make application with the Utah State Land 
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Board to purchase lands from the State of Utah which 
may be selected by the State from the United States 
in satisfaction of land grants to the State of Utah. 
This provision was enacted originally in 1899. Laws 
of Utah, 1899, Ch. 64, § 14. 
The applications in effect in 1907 provided that 
the State of Utah would sell the land only after it 
had been patented to the State. The application was 
merely an expectation and offer on the part of the 
applicant that, in the event selection was approved, 
he would purchase the lands if sold. The applicant 
obtained no vested rights in the land prior to the 
time the contract of sale was entered into. 
In Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 Pac. 534 (1900), 
a suit was brought by an applicant for the purchase 
of selection lands, contending that the application 
gave him a right in the lands which the board could , 
not ignore. The court rejected the contention and 
found that the applicant has no rights until the con-
tract is actually formed. As this court stated at 22 
Utah 64, 61 Pac. 537: 
Under the statute, after an application for lands is 
made, until the selection is made, and the price to 
be paid, and the time in which the deferred pay-
ments shall be made are fixed by the board, and 
assented to by the applicant, and a contract of sale 
containing the stipulation agreed upon is executed, 
the applicant has no vested rights whatever. The 
petition fails to state a cause of action. 
Consequentlv. an application made in 190'7 
would not grant -the applicant any vested interest 
which could not be changed by contract or statute. 
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As was shown in Point A., the Utah State Land Board 
could not, subsequent to May 12, 1919, enter into 
any contract or grant any patent covering lands 
which did not reserve the minerals to the State. 
Therefore, a contract entered into after that date 
which did not contain a mineral reservation was 
ultra vires and the statutory reservation would gov-
ern. 
It cannot be contended that there is any consti-
tutional objection under the contract clause of the 
Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 
10, or the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 1, 
Section 18. First, it is apparent that an application 
entered into in 1907 would give the applicant no 
vested rights, and, therefore, not be within the scope 
of the consitutional protection to rights in contract. 
Secondly, a contract entered into in 1920, to the ex-
tent that it failed to contain the statutory reservation, 
would be ultra vires, and as a matter of law subject 
to the reservation, in consequence of which there 
was no valid contract for the transfer of the mineral 
estate. 
It is well settled that the contract clause in both 
the Utah State and United States Constitutions is sub-
jec to the police power and the dominant interest 
of the State in protecting its economic interest. 
In Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 
290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934), the United States Supreme 
Court observed: 
Not onlv is the constitutional provision qualified by 
the me~sure of control which the State~retains over -
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remedial process, but the State also continues to 
possess authority to safeguard the vital interests 
of its _People. It does not matter that legislation ap-
propriate to that end "has the result of modifying 
or abrogating contracts already in effect" Stephen-
son v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1S32). Not only are 
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix ob-
ligations as between the parties, but the reservation 
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read 
into contracts as a postulate of the legal order ... 
This principle of harmonizing the constitutional 
prohibition with the necessary residium of state 
power has had progressive recognition in the de-
cisions of this Court. 
At 290 U.S. 437: 
The economic interest of the State may justify the 
exercise of its continuing and dominant protective 
power notwithstanding interference with contracts. 
The term "police power" was defined by the 
United States Supreme Court in Manigault v. 
Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) as follows: "That 
power is an exercise of the sovereign right of the 
Government to protect the general welfare of the 
people, and is paramount to any rights under con-
tracts betv·rnen individuals. Once in this domain oi 
the reserve power of the State the court must respect 
the "wide discretion on the part of the legislature in 
determining what is and what is not necessary." 
East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 
232 (1945). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that 
the police power takes precedence over the contract 
clause. State Road Comm'n of Utah v. Utah Power 
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& Light Co., 10 Utah2d 333, 353 P.2d 171 (1960). Kent 
Club v. Toronto. 6 Utah2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957). 
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court, 
in a case which bears substantial similarity to the 
question posed in the instant case, found no im-
pairment of the contract clause to the Constitution. 
In El Paso v. Simmons. 379 U.S. 497 (1965), a 
quiet title action was brought by the City of El Paso 
against the assignee of a redemption right under a 
Texas state land contract. At the time the contract 
was entered into, the State Land Commissioner of 
Texas sold the property subject to the statutory pro-
vision which was incorporated in the contract that, 
upon default, the purchaser would have a perpetual 
right of redemption. Subsequent to the contract, the 
Texas Legislature amended the law, restricting the 
redemption right to five years. On appeal before 
the United States Supreme Court, it was contended 
that the subsequent amendment to the Texas law 
could not interfere with the contractual right of re-
demption in existence at the time the contract had 
been entered into. The United States Supreme Court 
ruled to the contrary, finding that the police power 
interests of the State of Texas, clearing titles to state 
lands and protecting their economic interests and 
the state school fund, were paramount to the con-
tract clause. 
In the instant situation, it is clear that the in-
terests of the State of Utah in reserving mineral 
rights, protecting the uniform school fund, and pre-
serving the economic interests of the State are a 
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valid exercise of the police power. Therefore, there 
is no merit to any contention that there is a vested 
contractual right to the mineral estate by a pre-1919 
selection applicant. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has shown that the intent of the 
parties was to be bound by the state law governing 
contracts, that this law has vested mineral rights in 
state land to the State of Utah, that there are no 
vested rights of respondents to be protected, and 
finally that the police power of the state in attempting 
to protect an economic interest can abrogate con· 
tractual relationships in conflict with it. Therefore, 
appellant would request this court to reverse the 
finding of the trial court and hold that all mineral 
interests in the lands in question are vested in the 
State of Utah and that respondents herein have no 
rights to them whatsoever. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
LEROY S. AXLAND 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellant 
